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Abstract
In 1976, the Genetics Society of America (GSA) published a document enti-
tled “Resolution of Genetics, Race, and Intelligence.” This document laid out the 
Society’s position in the IQ controversy, particularly that on scientific and ethical 
questions involving the genetics of intellectual differences between human popula-
tions. Since the GSA was the largest scientific society of geneticists in the world, 
many expected the document to be of central importance in settling the controversy. 
Unfortunately, the Resolution had surprisingly little influence on the discussion. In 
1979, William Provine analyzed the possible factors that decreased the impact of 
the Resolution, among them scientists’ limited understanding of the relationship 
between science and ethics. Through the analysis of unpublished versions of the 
Resolution and exchanges between GSA members, I will suggest that the limited 
impact of the statement likely depended on a shift in the aims of the GSA due to the 
controversies that surrounded the preparation of the document. Indeed, the demands 
of the membership made it progressively more impartial in both scientific and politi-
cal terms, decreasing its potential significance for a wider audience. Notably, the 
troubled history of the Resolution raises the question of what can make effective or 
ineffective the communication between scientists and the public—a question with 
resonance in past and present discussions on topics of social importance.
Keywords IQ controversy · Group differences · Behavioral genetics · Intelligence · 
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Since the nineteenth-century beginnings of the debate on nature and nurture, schol-
ars have disagreed on the source of observed psychological variation within and 
between groups. Research on human populations, heredity, and intelligence have 
generated heated discussions with respect to many publications (e.g., Herrnstein 
1971; Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Jensen 1969; Levin 1997; Lynn 2008, 2010; 
Rushton 1995; Wade 2014; see also Weinberg 2020), as well as to specific events 
(Adams 2019; Lally 2018; Meredith 2018).
On several occasions, scientific societies and groups of scholars have attempted 
to settle the debate by publishing official statements and petitions, among them 
UNESCO (1950, 1952), American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(1963, 1967), American Psychological Association (2001), Cubelli (2010), Letters: 
“A Troublesome Inheritance” (2014), and American Society of Human Genetics 
(2018). Such statements have often divulged state-of-the-art knowledge in order to 
counter racism and discrimination. For instance, the 1950s UNESCO project was 
motivated by the belief that science had already produced the correct antiracist 
knowledge and the next step was to promulgate such knowledge worldwide. Nev-
ertheless, the statement—like other documents of the same sort—was unable to 
achieve its goal (see Brattain 2007; Provine 1986).
Among such statements, the “Resolution on Genetics, Race, and Intelligence” 
(Russell 1976; hereafter Resolution), published by the Genetics Society of America 
(GSA), is particularly interesting for its long and convoluted drafting process, which 
lasted roughly three years and involved many contributors. Indeed, the process 
required the efforts of hundreds of GSA members as well as an ad hoc Committee on 
Genetics, Race, Intelligence (1974–1975) appointed by the Society, which consisted 
of Harrison Echols (University of California, Berkeley), Walter E. Nance (Indiana 
University), David D. Perkins (Stanford University), Janice B. Spofford (University 
of Chicago), John R. G. Turner (then at State University of New York Stony Brook), 
and Elizabeth S. Russell (Jackson Laboratory, Bar Harbor, Maine). On the scien-
tific side, the document discussed methodological limitations of genetic studies of 
human intelligence. On the ethical side, it discouraged racism and discrimination.
Since the GSA, at the time boasting around 2600 members, was the largest scien-
tific society of geneticists in the world, many expected the document to be of central 
importance in providing guidance to policymakers and settling the IQ controversy. 
For instance, Evelyn Witkin, a geneticist at Rutgers University, commented that the 
Resolution may well have been “the most important statement that this generation of 
American geneticists is called upon to make, and each of us is obliged to express an 
honest judgment.”1 In the early phases of the project, the intention was to dissemi-
nate the Resolution in as many outlets as possible, including publication in Genet-
ics (the official journal of the Society), Science, Nature, and Bioscience as well as 
1 Letter from Evelyn Witkin to Oliver Smithies, 6 September 1975, John R. G. Turner Collection, Uni-
versity of Leeds Library, Special Collections, MS 2044, https:// explo re. libra ry. leeds. ac. uk/ speci al- colle 
ctions- explo re/ 510877, Leeds, England; hereafter Turner Collection.
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through press conferences. In the end, the final version of the document was only 
published in Genetics and had surprisingly little impact on discussions of genetics, 
race, and intelligence.
In 1979, William Provine, a historian of evolutionary biology and population 
genetics at Cornell University, analyzed the events relating to the drafting of the 
Resolution and pointed to factors that decreased its public resonance (Provine 1979; 
see also Provine 1986).2 According to Provine, the statement was not impactful 
because it did not clearly rebuke the hereditarian hypothesis and was not sufficiently 
publicized. Moreover, he believed that GSA members were “ethically naïve,” that 
is, they simply did not see the moral issues at stake (1979, p. 34). He supported this 
view by noting that, among the many members of the Society, only one addressed 
the question of the relationship between science and morality, namely, Norman H. 
Horowitz, a geneticist at the California Institute of Technology (Provine 1979, p. 25; 
1986, p. 880).
In 1977, officials of the Genetics Society of America deposited documents per-
taining to this debate in the society’s records held at the American Philosophical 
Society in Philadelphia. However, recently deposited materials at the University of 
Leeds Library, Special Collections provide an opportunity to investigate the history 
of the Resolution further.3 The collection of the population geneticist John R. G. 
Turner, School of Biology, University of Leeds, who was a member of the GSA 
ad hoc Committee, includes dozens of letters from his private correspondence with 
GSA members as well as several unpublished drafts of the Resolution.4 These mate-
rials help illuminate the deliberations of the ad hoc Committee and offer a revised 
perspective over that of Provine.
2 Provine’s analysis was based on copies of drafts of the resolution and private exchanges between GSA 
members that were provided to him; the materials were deposited at the American Philosophical Soci-
ety in September 1977; see Genetics Society of America Records (Mss.575.06.G28p); Committee on 
Genetics, Race, Intelligence, 1974–1975, Box  37, American Philosophical Society Library, Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, https:// search. amphi lsoc. org/ colle ctions/ view? docId= ead/ Mss. 575. 06. G28p- ead. xml 
(hereafter GSA Records, APS). According to the cover letter from by David Perkins (president of GSA) 
to Whitfield J. Bell, Jr. (APS executive director and librarian), 23 September 1977, the material included 
the records of the committee chair, Elizabeth Russell, as well as additional materials he added. Turner, 
originally a member of the committee, also provides his own “recollection of the background to the com-
mittee and the statement”; see GSA Records, APS, Committee on Genetics, Race, and Intelligence—
Background.
3 The material here reviewed (accessed in Spring 2018) is part of a collection of papers that John R. G. 
Turner donated to the University of Leeds Library, Special Collections and that is currently being pro-
cessed. For the letters relating to the GSA’s Resolution, see especially MS 2044/1/3/14, box 11.
4 The GSA Records at the APS include early exchanges between members of the Committee on Genet-
ics, Race, Intelligence that are not in the Turner Collection, including the petition for signatures prepared 
by Harrison Echols; see GSA Records, APS, Committee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence—Background 
Material, “Petition Concerning Genetics, Race and Intelligence.” https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ 
object/ text: 26835 8/# page/7/ mode/ 1up. The Turner Collection includes three additional drafts of the Res-
olution as well as letters and two documents by Douglas Futuyma and John Turner discussed here. It 
should be noted that, although Futuyma’s and Turner’s documents are not available at the APS archive, 
Provine (1979) cited them. He probably received them from Russell, chair of the ad hoc Committee, 
together with a copy of the correspondence between GSA members. See David Perkins to Elizabeth Rus-
sell, 11 February 1976, Committee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence – Correspondence.
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In the first section of the paper, I focus on the social context in which the IQ con-
troversy originated. This helps clarify why an important scientific society like the 
Genetics Society of America decided to take a public stand. In the second section, I 
describe the process of drafting the Resolution and discuss the major conceptual and 
perspectival differences between the various versions of the document that followed 
one after another between 1973 and 1976. Through the chronological analysis of 
correspondence, I highlight what pressures shaped the Resolution and provide a bet-
ter sense of the development of the GSA’s action. In the third section, I discuss the 
factors that may have decreased the influence of the document. In contrast to Pro-
vine’s conclusions, my analysis of the correspondence suggests that the statement’s 
minor impact probably had little to do with scientists’ limited appreciation of ethical 
questions.5 An interesting aspect that emerges from the correspondence is that the 
attempt to meet the demands of the membership made the document progressively 
more “impartial” and less informative in both scientific and political terms. This 
probably contributed to the decreased significance of the Resolution for both the 
public and the GSA members themselves. In this sense, Provine’s hypothesis that 
the statement had a small impact because it was not publicized enough is probably 
misleading. As I suggest, the “burying” of the Resolution, rather than being a cause 
of its limited impact, might rather reflect a shift in the aims of the GSA as its mem-
bers became increasingly aware of the complexity of the debate.
In the final section, I ask whether anything could have been done differently. In 
this sense, the history of the Resolution represents an ideal means for assessing past 
and contemporary debates on genetics, race, and intelligence. Discussions on this 
topic have continued to occur periodically despite the past efforts of scientific socie-
ties like the GSA. Many issues debated today were already being discussed in the 
1970s—including academic freedom, the relationship between science and ethics, 
and the social implications of genetics findings. This raises the question of what 
can make the communication between scientists and the public effective or ineffec-
tive—a question with resonance in past and present discussions on topics of social 
importance.
What Led the GSA to Take a Stand?
The debate on genetics, race, and intelligence has been revived on several occasions 
in the last century, but four periods were particularly important: (1) in 1916 mental 
tests were introduced in the US by psychologist Lewis Terman, which supported the 
eugenics movement by providing the means to analyze human intellectual abilities 
in quantitative terms (see Daniels 1973; Gould 1981; Kevles 1985; Terman 1916); 
(2) the early 1950s, when UNESCO published two statements on the subject (UNE-
SCO 1950, 1952; see Bangham 2015; Brattain 2007; Provine 1986); (3) the 1970s, 
when, as we shall see, the question of group differences became intertwined with 
5 Notably, the files at Leeds include the letters of several persons besides Horowitz who also discuss 
ethical and political issues, as I will discuss throughout this paper.
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heritability research that resulted in the IQ controversy; and (4) following the 1994 
publication of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve, after which 
the debate arose again (Block 1995; Devlin et al. 1997).
As a précis to the third period, in the late 1960s, the work of psychologists such 
as Cyril Burt, Arthur Jensen, and Hans Eysenck drew attention to the findings of 
behavioral genetics and their putative educational implications, causing a firestorm. 
Jensen’s 1969 paper “How Much Can We Boost Our IQ and Scholastic Achieve-
ments?” was particularly instrumental in kindling the discussion. Jensen pointed 
to the failure of compensatory educational programs and attributed such failure to 
disparities in IQ, which, he stated, were mostly due to inherited differences among 
individuals. Moreover, Jensen found reasonable the hypothesis that hereditary fac-
tors were involved in IQ differences between human populations.6
Jensen’s message was carried to the public by, among others, Harvard professor 
of psychology Richard Herrnstein and Stanford Nobel Prize winning physicist Wil-
liam Shockley. Herrnstein argued that if intelligence is important in success, and 
if it is largely heritable, then there will be genetic differences between members of 
different socioeconomic classes (Herrnstein 1971; for a critical review, see Daniels 
1973). Shockley, in turn, claimed that “our nobly intended welfare programs are 
promoting dysgenics-retrogressive evolution through the disproportionate reproduc-
tion of the genetically disadvantaged” (Kevles 1986, p. 271) and urged the National 
Academy of Sciences to pursue research on the topic.7 As Andrew Colman noted, 
a concept that started out as a “not unreasonable hypothesis” was increasingly pre-
sented as factual (2016, p. 187; see also Lewontin 1970).
Jensen’s paper had considerable impact on public discussions on education, espe-
cially among policymakers. As Daniels reported, Jensen appeared before various 
Congressional committees “to deliver his message that money spent on compensa-
tory education programs is ‘lavish’ and ‘extravagant’” (1973, p. 25), with his 1969 
inserted study into the Congressional Record. According to Daniel Moynihan (a for-
mer member of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who at the time was serv-
ing as an advisor to President Nixon), “the winds of Jensen were gusting through the 
capital at gale force” (Daniels 1973, p. 25; see also Rose et al. 1984, p. 19). Presi-
dent Nixon’s 1973–1974 budget included a proposal to demolish programs aimed at 
creating educational equality.
The advent of hereditarianism inspired strong opposition against psychometric 
and genetic findings. Since most hereditarians were not geneticists by education, 
6 Jensen drew on twin and adoption studies available at that time (e.g., Burt 1966; Newman et al. 1937; 
Shields 1962), according to which the heritability of IQ ranges between 0.5 and 0.8; for an overview of 
these data, see Eysenck and Kamin (1981). A heritability index is a measure of how much the observed 
variance in a trait (in a specific population, in a specific environment) is statistically associated with gen-
otypic variance. As I explain below, there have been extensive debates about whether heritability data 
can be interpreted in terms of genetic determination.
7 Shockley’s pronouncements on race and heredity had already begun to cause discontent within the 
academic community in the mid-1960s, attracting criticism from other Stanford scientists and members 
of the American Society of Human Genetics (Mitchell 2017) and of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (1967).
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some critics focused on how psychologists like Jensen (1969, 1972) and Eysenck 
(1971) misunderstood genetic data or misused quantitative genetic methods (Cav-
alli-Sforza and Bodmer 1970; DeFries 1972; Lewontin 1974). Douglas Futuyma, an 
evolutionary biologist at the State University of New York, illustrated this point:
Jensen and others … have asserted their conviction that races and social 
groups differ genetically in IQ, without (in my opinion) sufficiently emphasiz-
ing to lay audience the limitations on the data, and indeed, the limitations on 
the capacity of psychometrics and genetics to resolve the problem (given the 
constraints on experimental design). It is important … to communicate to this 
audience the extent and importance of these limitations.8
Most of the critics, however, pointed at the potentially harmful social implications 
of hereditarianism (Hirsch 1975; Kamin 1974; Kevles 1985; Paul 1998; Rose et al. 
1984). Indeed, hereditarians called into question the principle of equal opportunity, 
so that scientific and ethical questions became inextricably interconnected (Daniels 
1973; Panofsky 2014; Turner 1970).
As Provine noted, this was the period of the Civil Rights Movement: “there was 
no time in the history of America when thoughtful citizens were less sympathetic 
to hereditarian explanations for the differential success of racial groups” (1986, pp. 
877–878). The controversy was on the front pages of important newspapers and 
magazines (Bliss 2018; Snyderman and Rothman 1988). For instance, in a 1969 
article published in the New York Times, Lee Edson coined the term Jensenism to 
denote “the theory that IQ is largely determined by the genes,” a theory that Jerry 
Hirsch later called “an intellectual disgrace” (Hirsch 1975, p. 25; see also Lewontin 
1970). The study of IQ thus became shrouded by an aura of scandal, which brought 
personal abuse upon several scholars (Flew 1973; Jensen 1972; see also Colman 
2016).
A conspicuous group of leading scientists—among them Raymond Cattell, Fran-
cis Crick, Hans Eysenck, Richard Herrnstein, Arthur Jensen, and Jacques Monod—
signed a petition aimed at encouraging freedom in the study of the genetics of intel-
ligence (Page 1972). On the scientific side, the document claimed that scholars who 
studied the role of inheritance in human behavior believed that such hereditary influ-
ences were very strong. But the central problem identified by the petition was politi-
cal in nature:
The history of civilization shows many periods when scientific research or 
teaching was censured, punished, or suppressed for non-scientific reasons, 
usually for seeming to contradict some religious or political belief. … Today, 
a similar suppression, censure, punishment, and defamation are being applied 
against scientists who emphasize the role of heredity in human behavior. Pub-
lished positions are often misquoted and misrepresented; emotional appeals 
replace scientific reasoning; arguments are directed against the man rather than 
8 Douglas Futuyma, “Considerations for the Drafting of a GSA Statement on Race and IQ,” undated, 
Turner Collection, Leeds.
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against the evidence (e.g., a scientist is called “fascist,” and his arguments are 
ignored). (Page 1972, p. 660)
It is questionable, however, whether hereditarians’ academic freedom per se was 
under attack. For instance, Vetta (1973), in response to the petition, did not deny 
that researchers had the right to investigate the genetics of human behavior, but he 
criticized the scientific content of the petition. Likewise, most critics were accus-
ing hereditarians of being irresponsible because they were drawing educational and 
social prescriptions from genetic data, data that might well turn out to be inaccurate. 
Hirsch, for instance, wrote that “either Jensenists knew what was being perpetrated 
and [were] therefore responsible, or did not and [were] therefore irresponsible” 
(1975, p. 27). In sum, the IQ controversy generated a torrent of publications on a 
variety of questions involving human equality, discrimination, academic freedom, 
and social policies, as well as the relationship between scientists and society. It was 
in this context that the Genetics Society of America decided to take a public stand.
Below, I describe the process that gave rise to the Resolution, divided into three 
phases. In phase one, the committee produced five different drafts; in the second and 
third phases, three versions of the statement were disseminated among the whole 
GSA membership. As will be clear, correspondence between GSA members was of 
vital importance to the revision of the Resolution and its final form. Throughout 
the process, I argue, the document became progressively more impartial and less 
informative, contributing to decrease its potential significance for the public and 
hence diluting its ability to serve as an authoritative guide to the debate for the gen-
eral public.
Phase One: A Somewhat Hesitant Start
The 42nd annual meeting of the GSA, held in Berkeley, California in August 1973 
(concurrently with the 13th International Congress of Genetics), included a ses-
sion on “Genetics, Race and IQ” in which biologists, psychologists, and historians 
pointed out major difficulties in assessing the genetic contribution to IQ group dif-
ferences. The general consensus at the meeting was that IQ tests would not achieve 
equally valid results for different cultural groups.
At the Business Meeting of the society, Harrison Echols, a professor of molecular 
and cell biology at the University of California, Berkeley, presented a petition that 
harshly criticized hereditarianism and solicited signatures. The petition statement 
was not, however, approved by the membership; as Provine explained (1979), the 
consensus was that it was too strong.9 However, there was a motion from the floor 
9 See GSA Records, APS, Committee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence—Background Material, APS, 
“Petition Concerning Genetics, Race and Intelligence,” https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ 
commi ttee- genet ics- race- intel ligen ce- backg round- mater ial# page/7/ mode/ 1up. As Provine described, 
Echols was a member of a small group at Berkeley, known as the Committee on Genetics and Society 
(CGS), consisting of around fifteen professors, postdocs, and graduate students who had been meeting to 
“discuss issues of genetics, race and intelligence.” Echols and other CGS members were dismayed that 
the GSA session did not discuss what they considered to be key questions; hence, their decision to sub-
mit a resolution at the GSA Business Meeting (Provine 1976, pp. 21–22).
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that the Society’s executive committee appoint an ad hoc committee to draft a state-
ment expressing the official position of the Society in the controversy. The statement 
was to be submitted to the membership for approval and published in some form.
To get a clearer sense of the controversy among members, it is worth considering 
the following extract from the minutes of the Business Meeting laying out the charge 
for the ad hoc committee:
An extended discussion endued over a proposed resolution concerning the 
Society’s position on the subject of Genetics, Race and Intelligence. It was 
moved and seconded that the petition be referred to the Committee on Pub-
lic Relations for dissemination to the membership. Signatures returned would 
be retained for distribution to appropriate organizations or to the mass media. 
During the discussion an amendment to the motion was proposed and sec-
onded to change the wording in the resolution somewhat. Following discus-
sion, the amendment passed by a narrow margin. During further discussion of 
the amended motion a motion was made from the floor to table it. This motion 
passed.
Then a resolution was proposed and seconded from the floor that the executive 
committee be asked to appoint a committee to draft a resolution on the subject 
of Genetics, Race and Intelligence to be sent to the membership in the form 
of a ballot. The proposer indicated his intent that this be an ad hoc committee 
and not the Committee on Public Relations. Brief discussion followed and the 
resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority.10
Accordingly, the Society’s president, Melvin Green, appointed members of the Com-
mittee, drawing from a variety of areas of expertise.11 The Committee on Genet-
ics, Race, Intelligence originally consisted of Echols along with Walter E. Nance 
(human geneticist, Indiana University), David D. Perkins (Neurospera geneticist, 
Stanford University), Janice B. Spofford (evolutionary biologist, University of Chi-
cago), John R. G. Turner (population geneticist, State University of New York Stony 
Brook), and Elizabeth S. (“Tibby”) Russell (mammalian geneticist, Jackson Labora-
tory, Bar Harbor, Maine), who served as chairperson.12 After Perkins resigned in 
August 1975, he was replaced by James F. Crow (population geneticist, University 
of Wiscon-Madison). The aim of the statement they were charged to formulate was 
to advise the non-academic community on how to interpret scientific findings. As in 
the case of UNESCO’s project of the 1950s, the GSA’s action was premised on the 
10 “Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Business Meeting,” GSA Records, Committee on Genetics, Race, 
Intelligence—Background Material, APS, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ commi ttee- genet 
ics- race- intel ligen ce- backg round- mater ial# page/6/ mode/ 1up.
11 On this sequence of events, see also Elizabeth Russell, “Present Status of the Resolution on Genetics, 
Race and Intelligence prepared by the GSA ad hoc committee”, GSA Records, Committee on Genetics, 
Race, Intelligence – Draft Resolutions, Folder 1, APS, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ text: 
270435# page/3/ mode/ 1up.
12 According to Provine, Russell was selected as chair because she was considered “one of the nicest and 
most respectable persons alive, so members would naturally support her efforts to produce a resolution” 
(1979, p. 23).
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belief that it was possible to amend racism by disseminating scientific knowledge 
about the “true” relation between genetics, race, and intelligence.13
The Early Drafts of the Resolution
In the drafting of the Resolution, the committee proceeded sequentially through five 
different versions of the document. All of the drafts were written by Elizabeth Rus-
sell and then shared with members of the committee. Here I focus on three early 
versions of the Resolution, namely, Proposed Position Paper, Draft #1, and Draft #4, 
all of which are available in the Turner Collection at Leeds but are not in the GSA 
Records at the American Philosophical Society.14
The first version of the Resolution, entitled “Proposed Position Paper” (here-
after PPP), called on geneticists to oppose unsound scientific and social practices 
in order to avoid a revival of racism. PPP held that the silence of geneticists who 
opposed discriminatory policies was one of the reasons why such policies were able 
to be implemented. As in the case of Echols’s petition, which inspired PPP, this first 
version of the Resolution gave voice to the environmental side of the controversy. 
Indeed, the document was sharply critical of hereditarianism:
In recent years there has been a revival of theories which purport to show 
inherited differences in intelligence between races and social classes. On the 
basis of these theories, their proponents have suggested changes in social 
policy ranging from school segregation to sterilization of the “unfit.” The his-
tory of earlier eugenics movements demonstrates that great social damage can 
result from applications of faulty scientific reasoning. Unfounded theories of 
race improvement were used in the first part of the 20th century as the “scien-
tific” basis for sterilization laws in 31 states, miscegenation laws, and racially 
restrictive immigration laws.15
On the scientific side, PPP criticized the hereditarian theory on three separate ques-
tions: 1) whether IQ scores are an adequate measure of intelligence; 2) whether IQ is 
largely heritable; and 3) whether racial and social class differences in IQ are inher-
ited. Thus, the document concluded, “THERE IS NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
OF GENETIC DIFFERENCE IN INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN RACES” (capitals 
in the original).16
On the ethical side, PPP claimed that social policies proposed on the basis of 
hereditarian theories were unwarranted; rather, every child must be considered as a 
15 Elizabeth Russell, “Proposed Position Paper – Genetics Society of America,” undated, Turner Collec-
tion, Leeds.
16 I thank two anonymous reviewers for pointing to these questions, to which I will return later. One 
may wonder whether these questions are exclusively scientific and why the committee kept scientific and 
political aspects separated from each other.
13 Elizabeth Russell, “Proposed Position Paper – Genetics Society of America,” undated, Turner Collec-
tion, Leeds.
14 The committee produced two other drafts, neither of which are in the Leeds or APS archives; how-
ever, these two drafts were probably very similar to Draft #4.
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valuable individual rather than as a member of a particular racial or socioeconomic 
group. This was a vital point, given the frequent misinterpretation of statements 
about characteristics of populations. As Turner noted, “any statement about aver-
ages, whether right or wrong, becomes translated in the public mind as a statement 
about all members of the averaged group.”17
In January 1974, Russell sent the first draft of the Resolution to the committee, 
revised according to the suggestions she had received. Draft #1 is far more neutral 
than its precursor: both the political and scientific claims were significantly weak-
ened, and there is no explicit criticism of hereditarian positions. Citations from 
hereditarians such as Jensen were included to summarize the hereditarian view with-
out bias. A disclaimer on freedom of inquiry was also inserted:
We have no desire to discourage research on human intelligence. Freedom of 
scientific inquiry is a basic tenet of western society, and our knowledge of the 
human mind is very incomplete.… But we reject simplistic answers to com-
plex questions.18
 On the scientific side, the committee agreed that genetic differences between indi-
viduals—in appropriately selected, culturally homogeneous groups—may account 
for approximately 80 percent of the observed variation in the aspects of intelligence 
measured by IQ tests, as heritability analyses seemed to attest (see Eysenck and 
Kamin 1981). However, Draft #1 stressed that the “undisputed fact” of low average 
scores on IQ tests in some groups does not in any way prove their genetic inferiority:
Our concern as geneticists is that neither theory nor practice in education or 
politics shall rest upon a premise of difference in mental capacity between 
races unless or until the reality of such a difference has been established. 
(emphasis added)
Later, the relationship between ethical and empirical questions generated discus-
sions among the membership. Indeed, the claim cited above seems to imply that 
political equality should depend on genetic equality, which in turn might imply that, 
if we find evidence of a genetic difference between groups, we may treat people in 
the groups differently. Thus, later versions of the Resolution did not draw such a 
problematic inference, but the uncertain relationship between factual and normative 
aspects of the controversy is probably one reason why the GSA committee often 
kept scientific and political questions separate from each other (as will be discussed 
below).
Between February and October 1974, the committee produced three further 
drafts, only one of which is extant.19 For the present discussion, however, Draft #4 
17 John Turner to Elizabeth Russell, 28 April 1974, Turner Collection, Leeds.
18 Elizabeth Russell, “Genetics Society Resolution on Genetics and IQ – Draft – to be submitted to the 
ad hoc GSA Committee,” January 1974, Turner Collection, Leeds.
19 For the Resolution drafts held at APS, see https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ text: 270435. 
Discussion of these drafts by committee members and others is available in (digitized) letters in GSA 
Records, APS: Committee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence—Committee Correspondence, 1974–1975.
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well illustrates how the various versions gradually adopted a more cautious tone 
that substantially departs from from PPP.20 The new version brought back criticism 
of hereditarians and omitted direct citations from their works. This generated con-
troversy within the committee; for example, Turner urged Russell to restore quota-
tions from hereditarians. Another point of divergence lay in the scientific thesis; as 
a result, four different paragraphs (written by Echols, Nance, Perkins, and Russell, 
respectively) were included in Draft #4 about the extent to which geneticists disa-
greed on heritability data.21
To summarize, in the first phase, the committee swung from a Resolution sup-
porting one side of the controversy to a neutral one and then back again to the origi-
nal position. Draft #4 then served as the basis for the first official version of the 
Resolution, which was disseminated to all the Society’s members.
Phase Two: Tensions in the Genetics Society of America
In January 1975, the first official version of the Resolution (hereafter Statement 
#1) was sent to the GSA membership for approval. The contents of this document 
included no major changes from Draft #4. It was divided into four separate sections: 
1) preamble, 2) scientific statement, 3) implications for society, and 4) the role of 
geneticists.22
GSA members were asked to respond to each subsection as to whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the substance, felt insufficiently informed to judge, or were 
against taking a stand. Between January and February 1975, the committee received 
the membership’s responses by mail, with close to half of the GSA membership 
responding to the poll (1099 members in total). A great majority (almost 90 percent) 
agreed with the substance of each of the four sections (see Table 1).23
In the following months, the committee received about eighty-five letters with 
comments on Statement #1. Some were wholly supportive, many were generally 
favorable but suggested specific alterations, and many others were sharply criti-
cal. Three types of problems were cited by the members who opposed the Resolu-
tion: (1) the scientific validity of the statement; (2) the political nature of the GSA’s 
action or the political implications of the text’s tone; and (3) the conflation of ethi-
cal and empirical questions. In the next section, I analyze the major controversies 
20 Elizabeth Russell, “Proposed Position Paper – Genetics Society of America—Draft #4,” undated, 
Turner Collection, Leeds.
21 Russell laid out the slight differences in Draft #4 from previous versions in a letter to J. Spofford. Let-
ter from Elizabeth Russell to Janice Spofford, 13 May 1974, GSA Records, APS, https:// diglib. amphi 
lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ text: 27024 4/# page/7/ mode/ 1up.
22 Of the four versions of the scientific thesis, the committee adopted the moderate one, according to 
which existing data on IQ scores of identical twins raised apart convinced some, but not all, geneticists of 
a considerable degree of heritability of IQ.
23 It is worth noting that the number of responses is remarkable given that all communications between 
the Society and the members were transmitted via regular mail service.
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that shrouded Statement #1 and were decisive for driving the Resolution towards 
impartiality.
Dissenting Voices on Statement #1
Regarding the scientific validity of the statement, the rejection of psychometric and 
heritability studies disturbed many scholars, including Giuseppe Bertani, Everett 
Dempster, William Libby, Newton Morton, Eliot Spiess, and Sewall Wright. Some 
believed that IQ was a good—though imperfect—measure of intelligence. Others 
argued that evidence existed for a sizable genetic contribution to IQ differences 
within and between groups—or, at least, that there was no definitive evidence for the 
contrary assumption. For instance, Earl Green, a geneticist at Jackson Laboratory, 
Bar Harbor, Maine (and a colleague of Russell’s), criticized the committee for hav-
ing overestimated current knowledge on the topic:
In the face of the scanty evidence to date, it seems fatuous to say there is NO 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF GENETIC DIFFERENCE IN INTELLI-
GENCE BETWEEN RACES. One could say the same thing when there is no 
evidence of any sort at all.24 (capitals in original)
Moreover, Green noted that the sentence in capitals might allow the interpretation 
that evidence was abundant and negative. Biologist Robert Fowler, then at the Uni-
versity of San Francisco, was more adamant in his conclusions, arguing that one 
could not deny that intelligence was predominantly determined by genetic factors, 
because this would be contrary to fundamental principles of genetics:
[This] is not merely incorrect; it is ridiculous for a geneticist. This implies that 
the formation of the human brain and the remaining components of the nerv-
ous system, which are responsible for the expression of behavior termed intel-
ligence, have little genetic basis. It also implies that the difference in intel-
ligence between humans and any other animal, for example, a frog, is due 
almost entirely to our different environments.25
 It is worth noting that neither hereditarians nor those supporting environmental 
influences had (or have) ever denied the importance of the genotype in cognitive 
differences between different species. Moreover, the existence of some genetic basis 
for human intelligence was not being questioned. Although the details of the con-
troversy have slightly changed over time (Paul 1998), the disagreement has mostly 
resided in the suitability of heritability studies to assess the relative magnitude of 
genetic and environmental influences on cognitive differences within the human 
species.
Fowler interpreted heritability data as capable of explaining some things regard-
ing the way that the genotype determines the phenotype, for example, how genes 
24 Earl Green to Elizabeth Russell, 28 February 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
25 Robert Fowler to Oliver Smithies (president of GSA), 9 September 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds. 
Although this letter was written later than the others, it discusses the contents of Statement #1.
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cause the development of different brain functions and structures in different spe-
cies. However, it should be noted that the relationship between heritability data and 
genetic causality is not at all straightforward. I will return to this, since this aspect 
emerges more clearly later in the correspondence.
Regarding the political nature of the GSA’s action, many scholars (for example, 
Giuseppe Bertani, James Crow, John DeFries, Everett Dempster, Earl Green, and 
Sewall Wright) argued that the GSA, as a scientific society, should have concerned 
itself with science only, since scientists are not more qualified than others to express 
ethical and political opinions. Moreover, Dempster, William Libby, E. Python, and 
Benjamin Rasmusen described Statement #1 as politically biased for its attack on 
unnamed individuals. In this view, connecting hereditarianism to eugenics and 
Nazism was perceived as unfair towards the view of hereditarians.26
Others addressed ethical questions involved. For example, Bernard Davis, Nor-
man Horowitz, and John Turner criticized Statement #1 for being unable to disen-
tangle moral problems from scientific ones. They felt that the document placed the 
GSA in a particularly weak moral position because it implied that egalitarianism (an 
ethical stance) should depend on the genetic equality of all humans (a factual state-
ment). For instance, according to Davis, a biologist at Harvard Medical School:
Wide publicity, and much governmental support, has been given to the view 
that equality of opportunity is best measured by ethnic parity in the distribu-
tion of all kinds of jobs and school admissions. People are entitled to believe 
in such parity as a moral imperative. However, if they believe in it as a con-
sequence of an assumption about the distribution of genetic potential, that 
assumption is subject to scientific scrutiny.
Moreover, Davis also compared the draft Resolution with the 1963 report of the 
American Association of the Advancement of Science (AAAS 1963), which con-
sidered the use of evidence for race differences as a basis for defending segregation:
Table 1  Results of the poll on the first official version of the “Resolution of Genetics, Race and Intelli-
gence.” John R. G. Turner Collection, University of Leeds Library, Special Collections (MS 2044)







Preamble 975 (88.7%) 76 18 50
Statement 972 (88.4%) 76 24 54
Implications 1056 (96.1%) 14 3 40
Role 1041 (94.8%) 24 7 42
26 Note that some forms of hereditarianism do not imply strong genetic determinism, but rather hold 
that genetic factors play some role in individual IQ differences. Nonetheless, for many scholars, such a 
moderate form of hereditarianism is equally unacceptable if based on the analysis of variance or twin and 
adoption studies; see, for example, Bailey (1997) and Kaplan (2015).
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The Committee could clearly point out that the evidence did not support the 
conclusion and was irrelevant, since the Supreme Court had ordered equal 
civil rights primarily on grounds of moral principle rather than of assumed or 
demonstrated intellectual equality.27
On this ethical problem, Turner also commented: “To say that racial discrimination 
is wrong because there is no genetic difference is to invite the counter-proposition 
that racial discrimination is right because there is a genetic difference.”28
To summarize, many GSA members criticized the implicit attempt of Statement 
#1 to favor one side of the controversy. This persuaded Oliver Smithies (University 
of Wisconsin geneticist and president of GSA, 1975–1976) to continue the process: 
he made a motion for drafting an alternative version of the Resolution (hereafter 
Statement #2), analyzed in the next section.
Phase Three: Towards Impartiality
Based on a simple numerical accounting—the approval of around 90 percent of 
members to all sections of Statement #1—the GSA’s course of action in the win-
ter of 1975 seemed straightforward: to publish the Resolution as formulated along 
with a tabulation of the responses from the members. However, in March, Smith-
ies proposed not to publish Statement #1 and drafting an alternative document that 
addressed the concerns expressed by members. Arguing that the publication of 
Statement #1 would be a serious failure for the GSA, Smithies stated that, in his 
view, “a vital part of all scientific endeavors is the ability to accept criticisms and to 
attempt to answer them.”29 Thus, Smithies himself prepared a new version aimed at 
reflecting the scientific ideas that emerged from the letters and at creating a better 
separation of scientific facts and ethical principles.
The Alternative Version of the Resolution
A limitation that Smithies identified in Statement #1 was the emphasis on the poor 
evidence for genetic differences in intelligence between human populations. Such 
emphasis, in his view, concealed the equally valid proposition that there was no con-
vincing evidence that such differences were environmental in origin. For this reason, 
Statement #2 recognized how technically problematic the issue was:
A genetic component for IQ differences within a group does not necessar-
ily imply the existence of a significant genetic component in IQ differences 
27 Bernard Davis to Oliver Smithies, 4 April 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
28 John Turner to Elizabeth Russell, 15 April 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
29 Oliver Smithies, “Statement (essentially as presented at GSA Business Meeting, 8/14/1975),” Turner 
Collection, Leeds. See also Oliver Smithies to GSA Members, 15 July 1975, GSA Records, APS, Com-
mittee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence—Draft Resolutions, Folder 1, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan 
dora/ object/ text: 270435# page/ 12/ mode/ 1up.
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between groups: there may be overriding effects caused by differences in their 
environments. The problems of unravelling the various factors are so great that 
it is not possible at present to say unequivocally that there is or is not an appre-
ciable genetic component in differences in IQ between racial groups in this 
country.30
This version was also considerably more balanced than the previous one in terms of 
the political connotations of the debate. In order to decrease the bias against heredi-
tarians, the statement addressed criticisms as well towards those who believed that 
environmental factors played a significant role:
The excesses of the early eugenics movement, despite the idealistic intentions 
of its founders, show the pitfall of naive hereditarian assumptions. Equally 
unsupportable is a doctrinaire environmentalism that denies any significant 
role of heredity in important human behavioral traits. The fact that prejudiced 
misuses of genetic ideas can have tragic consequences when converted into 
national policies is exemplified by the hereditarian policies of Nazi Germany 
and the Lysenkoist brand of environmentalism that prevailed for a time in Rus-
sia.
Thus, the focus shifted from the heredity/environment debate to the refutation of 
the ideological aberrations to which both sides of the controversy were potentially 
exposed. Worries about the legitimacy of the Resolution were addressed by observ-
ing that truth could not be determined by referendum, but that members of scientific 
societies nonetheless ought to take a position on matters that might affect public 
policy.
Finally, regarding the ethical question, Statement #2 pointed to the independence 
of moral principles from empirical data, as suggested in the letters:
The harm in the present controversy is not in the suggestion that individuals 
and groups may differ genetically, but rather in the illogical conclusion some-
times drawn that genetic heterogeneity provides a justification for political 
and social inequality. It is this inference that we reject and abhor. Political and 
social equality, and equality of opportunity, are ideals to which we subscribe 
as citizens; they are not derived from any assumption of biological uniformity. 
We deplore racism and discrimination not because of scientific knowledge, but 
because they are contrary to our political values and our respect for humanity. 
Social policies, including those affecting educational practice, should recog-
nize human diversity by providing the maximum opportunity for the potential 
of a person to be realized, not as a member of any social or racial group, but as 
an individual.
30 Oliver Smithies, “Statement of GSA Members (Draft of Revised Version),” 3 July 1975, GSA 
Records, APS, Genetics, Race, Intelligence Committee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence—Draft Resolu-
tions, Folder 1, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ text: 270435# page/ 10/ mode/ 1up.
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Between June and July 1975, Statement #2 circulated among the members of the 
GSA. Although Smithies’ version of the Resolution met the expectations of the criti-
cal side of the Society, it sowed discontent in the side that supported the previous, 
less impartial version.
Dissenting Voices on Statement #2
The committee received several letters responding to Statement #2, some of which 
expressed gratitude for the revisions, others disappointment. Among those who 
lamented that the committee’s decision process was unfair to the will of the mem-
bership were Harrison Echols, Patricia Lawrence, Richard Lewontin, David Per-
kins, and David Radin. Lewontin, a geneticist and evolutionary biologist at Harvard 
University who was on the front lines of the IQ controversy (Lewontin 1970, 1974; 
Rose et al. 1984), disagreed with the decision to rewrite the statement—in his opin-
ion drastically—to respond to a handful of criticisms, despite the overwhelming 
positive response of the membership to the previous version.31 Patricia Lawrence 
(University of California, Berkeley) described the new procedure as “autocratic,” as 
it implied that the minority of persons who opposed the previous version possessed 
some superior qualities that the supporting members lacked.32
Several scholars pointed out that the new Resolution confused heritability with 
inheritance and genetic causality. Evolutionary and molecular biologist Thomas 
Gregg of Miami University, for example, wrote:
[The Resolution] implies that high heritability means that IQ is mostly deter-
mined by genetic factors. It then follows if most geneticists were convinced 
that IQ has a high heritability, we would be forced to admit that racial differ-
ences in IQ were in fact genetically determined. It is absolutely essential for us 
to clearly point out [that], despite widespread assumptions to the contrary, her-
itability values alone do not provide information about how important genetic 
factors are in the determination of a trait or, more importantly, whether there 
are genetic differences between races.33
It is worth considering Gregg’s point more closely. The relationship between herit-
ability and genetic causality has been the subject of intense debates and a common 
source of misunderstanding underlying the IQ controversy. Indeed, since heritability 
is a statistical parameter involving variance in populations, many have argued that 
heritability data (usually acquired through adoption and twin studies) tells us little 
about the mechanism through which genes influence individual differences in com-
plex phenotypes, or about phenotypic development more generally (see Downes and 
Matthews 2019; Colman 2016; Gottlieb 1995; Lewontin 1974; Oftedal 2005; Schaf-
fner 2016; Serpico 2018; Tabery 2014; Visscher et al. 2008; Wahlsten 1994).
31 Richard Lewontin to Oliver Smithies, 1 August 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
32 Patricia Lawrence to Oliver Smithies, 4 August 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
33 Thomas Gregg to Oliver Smithies, 30 October 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
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This point is significant in ethical terms, too, because it reflects concerns about 
how the public could interpret the genetic data with respect to the problem of human 
equality. Indeed, the high heritability of a trait is frequently understood as indicating 
that the development of such trait is strongly determined by genes and thus “fixed,” 
canalized, or insensible to environmental influences. However, this is a crucial mis-
understanding: the high heritability of a trait is compatible with its plasticity (Grif-
fiths 2002; Sauce and Matzel 2018; Serpico and Borghini 2020).34 Thus, the target 
audience of the Resolution was probably not interested in heritability per se, but 
rather in the canalization or plasticity of intelligence (a question about which the 
genetics methods available in the 1970s could provide no clear answer). The dif-
ficulty of drawing this technical distinction into a statement for public consump-
tion was likely one of the central limitations of the early versions of the Resolution, 
which were partly addressed in the final version.
Other geneticists—for example, Justin Frost, Douglas Futuyma, Sanford Lacks, 
Patricia Lawrence, Satya Prakash, David Radin, John Turner, and Evelyn Witkin—
blamed the committee for having lessened the potential appeal of the Resolution 
for the public. In their view, while the original statement was a public service, the 
new one lost sight of the original motivations behind the GSA’s action, namely, per-
suading geneticists to oppose unwarranted (and potentially racist) interpretations 
of biological findings. Moreover, the new version was considered too neutral, and 
thus unhelpful for taking a position on the issue, because it said nothing with which 
someone could disagree.
Importantly, the correspondence concerning Statement #2 drew attention to the 
relationship between science and society. David Radin, a geneticist at the University 
of California, Berkeley, highlighted that geneticists—as geneticists—have a respon-
sibility in social matters in which the interpretation and application of their science 
is at issue.35 Justin Frost, also at Berkeley, argued that announcing the results of the 
poll was by no means an attempt to decide scientific truths by referendum; the issue 
at stake was not a matter of science but rather one of social responsibility:
If persons like Shockley go around saying there is convincing evidence of 
genetic difference in intelligence between races the public should be made 
equally aware that, in the judgement of most geneticists, the present evidence 
is not convincing. … Ordinarily of course we do not poll ourselves on ques-
tions of scientific controversy, such as the best model of chromosome struc-
ture, because it is inappropriate for science and public policy is not affected by 
current judgements on chromosome structure. But in this case scientific judge-
34 The concept of canalization was used by Conrad Hal Waddington to denote “the property of a devel-
opmental process of being to some extent modifiable, but to some extent resistant to modification” (1961, 
p. 270). Thus, it involves both phenotypic plasticity and robustness: on the one hand, plasticity concerns 
the ability of environmental influences to alter genetic expression (Bradshaw 1965); on the other hand, 
robustness concerns the ability of an organism to develop as a typical individual of its species (and thus 
to have certain phenotypic traits) despite minor perturbations from the genotype and the environment 
(Palmer 1994).
35 David Radin to Oliver Smithies, 11 August 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
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ments about IQ studies are being used in an attempt to influence public policy 
and the public has the right to be informed about these judgements. The poll is 
for the use of the public, not the science of the matter.
Frost also openly criticized quantitative genetic methods for their limited value in 
the study of human behavior:
If the application of quantitative genetics to human traits is fraught with com-
plications and potential biases, why should such research be encouraged? … 
What is the point of ascertaining IQ equality or non-equality between races if 
it has no effect on public policy?36
This question was also raised by Satya Prakash (a molecular biologist then at the 
University of Rochester), who saw no valid reason why research in quantitative 
genetics should not be discouraged.37 Relatedly, Futuyma wrote that research on the 
heredity of group differences “should be done if its results can be envisioned to have 
substantial social benefit.” He continued:
But it is not clear how generalizations about mean genetic differences among 
social groups, if proven, would be socially useful, if we subscribe to the ... 
principle that each individual is to be nurtured and provided with equal oppor-
tunity. For the only way in which a generalized statement about a group can be 
used is by treating each individual (or at least many individuals) in that group 
in a manner determined by his or her membership in that group, rather than by 
his or her individual characteristics.38
In sum, Smithies’ Resolution was judged as too impartial, and thus unfaithful to 
the original aims of the GSA’s action. In order to address these criticisms, Smithies 
made a new motion aimed at deciding whether to publish the first or the second ver-
sion of the Resolution.
The Final Version of the Resolution
The decision about the fate of the Resolution was scheduled to be taken during the 
44th GSA Annual Meeting in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, in August 1975. Mem-
bers were to be asked to express their opinion on the two alternative documents. 
Unfortunately, a definitive decision was not reached, probably because many disa-
greed with the attempt to make this decision at a meeting that some committee mem-
bers were unable to attend. As a consequence, Russell was asked to draft yet a third 
version (hereafter Statement #3) that could bridge the gap between the previous two 
36 Justin Frost to Oliver Smithies, 13 August 1975, Turner Collection, Leeds.
37 Satya Prakash to Elizabeth Russell, 23 December 1975, GSA Records, APS, Race, Intelligence Com-
mittee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence – Correspondence, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ 
satya- praka sh-x- eliza beth- russe ll- corre spond ence- 1975# page/4/ mode/ 2up.
38 Douglas Futuyma, “Considerations for the drafting of a GSA statement on race and IQ,” undated, 
Turner Collection, Leeds.
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iterations. In late November 1975, a special meeting took place at O’Hare Airport 
between the members of the committee, with James Crow (University of Wisconsin-
Madison, having replaced David Perkins), along with two additional “non-voting” 
society members, Douglas Futuyma (SUNY, Stony Brook) and Sewall Wright (Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison), where they were to discuss and improve the final 
draft.39
Essentially, Statement #3 preserved the moderate tones of its immediate precur-
sor. As regards the scientific thesis, the statement invited caution in interpreting 
genetics data:
Although there is substantial agreement that genetic factors are to some extent 
responsible for differences in IQ within populations, those who have carefully 
studied the question disagree on the relative magnitudes of genetic and envi-
ronmental influences and on how they interact. … In our view, there is no con-
vincing evidence as to whether there is or is not an appreciable genetic differ-
ence in intelligence between races.40
No connection between hereditarianism and Nazi Germany was drawn, nor between 
environmentalism and Lysenkoism, making Statement #3 even more impartial. The 
choice not to mention the political connotations of the debate allowed the GSA to 
achieve impartiality about scientific opinions, but it left aside important—though 
difficult—questions.
In this version, the concept was introduced for the first time that the high herit-
ability of a trait does not imply canalization:
Although the variation in a trait may be largely genetic, this does not mean 
that the degree of expression of that trait cannot be altered by environmental 
manipulation. Nor does a large environmental component in variation neces-
sarily imply that we can easily change it.
 As in Statement #2, the ethical thesis was clearly separated from the scientific one, 
and it emphasized the loose connection between empirical data and moral principles:
Social policies, including those affecting educational practice, should recog-
nize human diversity by providing the maximum opportunity for all persons 
to realize their potential, not as members of races or classes but as individuals. 
We deplore racism and discrimination, not because of any special expertise but 
because they are contrary to our respect for each human individual. Whether 
or not there are significant genetic inequalities in no way alters our ideal of 
political equality, nor justifies racism or discrimination in any form.
39 For more details about this phase, see Provine (1979).
40 Elizabeth Russell, “Statement of GSA Members on Heredity, Race, and IQ,” undated, Turner Collec-
tion, Leeds. Many slightly different versions of this document are available at APS; see GSA Records, 
APS, Committee on Genetics, Race, Intelligence—Draft Resolutions, Folder 2, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. 
org/ islan dora/ object/ text: 270436# page/1/ mode/ 1up.
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Finally, the statement noted that genetic research may yield valid and socially use-
ful results and should not be discouraged, but that it was scientists’ responsibility to 
speak out against any political misuse of genetics and the drawing of social conclu-
sions from inadequate data.
In January 1976, Statement #3 was circulated to the members of the Society. 
Most responded positively to the new version: 1,488 members expressed their opin-
ion, with 94 percent supporting the publication of the document. As a result, in July 
1976, the final version of the Resolution was finally published, appearing in Genet-
ics, volume 83, no. 3, part 1 supplement; it is now available online in the historical 
records of the Genetics Society of America.41 According to Provine, the fact that 
the statement was “buried” in the Supplement, separated from the scientific jour-
nal, contributed to reducing the public resonance of the document: “Most members 
of the GSA never even knew that the resolution was published and certainly no 
attempt was made to widely publicize the resolution to the news media as originally 
intended” (Provine 1986, p. 880).
The Limited Impact of the Resolution
Although the GSA was and is considered one of the world’s foremost scientific 
societies, and although the Resolution was approved by hundreds of internationally 
renowned scholars, it received little attention from both academic and non-academic 
audiences.42 In his publications, Provine suggested that the GSA could have issued 
a “politically effective statement” that was a clear rebuke to hereditarianism (1979, 
p. 34; 1986, p. 881). However, the committee eventually realized that the genetics 
community was far less unanimous on the topic than it had expected. Many scien-
tists defended the reliability of psychometrics and genetics data as well as hereditari-
anism—in one form or another. It is likely that this made it impossible to reject the 
hereditarian hypothesis without disappointing the many members asking for more 
impartiality.
Provine also pointed to scientists’ education as “inadequate” for framing their 
positions (1979, p. 34). This may have been why GSA members were unable to rec-
ognize the moral issue at stake and so supported a Resolution implying that the prin-
ciple of equal opportunity should depend on the genetic equality of all humans. In 
41 An Abridged History of the Genetics Society of America. Compiled from the Records of the Genetics 
Society of America and the GENETICS Journal, 1931–2008 by staff member Karen Goodman, Spring 
2008, pp. 15–16, http:// www2. genet ics- gsa. org/ pdf/ GSAhi story scrap book. pdf.
42 Provine (1979, 1986) is not the only scholar at the time who lamented that the Resolution’s impact 
was very limited. For instance, Mertens (1978, p. 110) commented that the document “has not received 
the wide distribution and publicity it deserves.” In a personal communication (March 2018), John R. 
G. Turner noted that the final Resolution was “so oracular that it had, I suspect, very little influence.” 
Another imperfect but still informative piece of evidence for the limited impact of the Resolution is the 
scarce number of publications that cite it: to my knowledge, apart from Provine’s two papers, only Kev-
les (1985), Milkman (1978), and Panofsky (2014) mention it. There certainly may be others, but still, 
the number is surprisingly small when compared to the much wider influence of publications by Arthur 
Jensen, Hans Eysenck, and Richard Lewontin, and if we consider the public significance of the debate.
1 3
The Cyclical Return of the IQ Controversy
other words, the Resolution implied that an ought (“we should treat all humans as 
equal”) could be derived from an is (“all humans are genetically equal”). However, 
there are also good reasons to think that those involved in the discussion were far 
from being ethically naïve. Indeed, the correspondence shows far more reflective-
ness than Provine acknowledged—something that brings to the surface the complex-
ities that probably discouraged stronger political action.
The ethical awareness of the GSA members is testified by the fact that the infer-
ence from an is to an ought was present only in Draft #1, which was not sent to the 
membership. By contrast, both Statement #2 and Statement #3 deplored racism and 
discrimination on the basis that they were contrary to shared ethical values.
It was also very clear to the members of the committee that the aim of the GSA’s 
action was “purely political,” as Turner described it,43 because both its motivations 
and objectives involved political elements. For instance, Turner noted that much 
of the debate concerned the principle of equal opportunity rather than science, and 
stressed the importance of not making the mistake that Jensen seemed to be guilty 
of, namely, imagining that intellectual debates take place in an apolitical vacuum.44 
Similarly, Futuyma argued that it is not always possible to dissociate the practice of 
science from the political bases that serve to determine what the applications of the 
research will be.45 Echols noted that it was only through a political statement that 
the misuse of scientific knowledge could be avoided.46 In addition, Turner pointed 
out that:
one interpretation of the findings seems to support racism, and the natural 
revulsion for this can be used to drum up feelings in favour of the extreme and 
doctrinaire environmentalism popular with some psychologists. Geneticists are 
caught in the middle: we are invited to join irrational environmentalism for 
fear of seeming to support racism.47
These comments clearly denote sensibility and an understanding of the subtleties 
underlying the debate. It is probably such an awareness that led the committee to try 
to issue a neutral statement that omitted the political dimension of the debate.
Indeed, the correspondence on this topic revealed a tension between the scien-
tists’ faith in academic freedom and concerns for the potentially harmful implica-
tions of the genetic data—especially considering that the data might have turned out 
to be inaccurate. Given the difficulty of resolving this tension, the only viable option 
was to disconnect ethical principles and empirical data from each other (a strategy 
that no members criticized).
43 John Turner, “Some Propositions,” undated, Turner Collection, Leeds.
44 John Turner to Elizabeth Russell, 26 February 1974, Turner Collection, Leeds.
45 Douglas Futuyma, “Considerations for the drafting of a GSA statement on race and IQ,” undated, 
Turner Collection, Leeds.
46 Harrison Echols to Elizabeth Russell, 3 March 1975, GSA Records, APS, Committee on Genetics, 
Race, Intelligence – Correspondence, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ text: 26838 3/# page/ 
11/ mode/ 1up.
47 John Turner, “Some Propositions,” undated, Turner Collection, Leeds.
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An interesting consequence of pursuing impartiality was that the committee was 
unable to inspect the full range of implications of the stated disconnection between 
science and ethics. The ethical position expressed in the Resolution involved the fol-
lowing principle: whether or not there are significant genetic inequalities, this in no 
way alters our ideal of political equality. Thus, social policies should provide equal 
opportunity for all persons to realize their potential, not as members of groups, but 
as individuals.
One implication questions the social utility of research on the genetics of group 
differences. This was suggested by Futuyma when he wrote, “it is not clear how gen-
eralizations about mean genetic differences among social groups, if proven, would 
be socially useful, if we subscribe to the … principle that each individual is to be 
nurtured and provided with equal opportunity.”48 In other words, research on this 
topic might not be relevant to social policies at all because, regardless of what genet-
ics research will find, society will continue to give equal educational opportunities 
to all individuals regardless of their background. This implication may not have been 
accepted by the GSA membership because it directly questioned how worthwhile 
the whole field of quantitative behavioral genetics was.
Ultimately, the committee realized that it was not possible to write a politically 
meaningful or effective statement as scientists—and certainly not as a scientific 
society. This sheds new light on the “burying” of the Resolution, which was prob-
ably not one of the causes of its limited impact, as Provine suggested (1986, p. 880), 
but rather a symptom of the awareness that the committee gained throughout the pro-
cess.49 This is a very natural interpretation of the events if we consider that, despite 
the political engagement of its members, the committee produced a series of drafts 
that progressively separated scientific and practical aspects, to the point that politi-
cal action gave way to a statement recognizing the mere existence of disagreement 
among scientists on the genetics of group differences.
What Can the Case of the Resolution Teach Us?
Regarding the trajectory towards impartiality, one may wonder whether the GSA 
committee could have done anything differently to make the statement more effec-
tive or meaningful for the public. In this respect, a comparison of their process with 
that taken by other scientific societies in the 1960s and 1970s can be instructive.
48 Douglas Futuyma, “Considerations for the drafting of a GSA statement on race and IQ,” Undated, 
Turner Collection, Leeds.
49 Regarding the committee’s awareness, some expressed concern that the Resolution could be misun-
derstood. For instance, Janice Spofford (University of Chicago) noted: “As to wider publicity, … I would 
like to see us be somewhat selective about what is publicized…. I suspect some wider publicity is going 
to be necessary inasmuch as what gets released is less likely to be distorted if it is done by us.” Janice 
Spofford to Elizabeth Russell and Oliver Smithies, 7 April 1975, GSA Records, APS, Committee on 
Genetics, Race, Intelligence – Correspondence, https:// diglib. amphi lsoc. org/ islan dora/ object/ text: 27024 
4/# page/1/ mode/ 1up.
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The GSA was not the only scientific society in this period that was concerned 
about issues at the intersection between genetics and society. The American Soci-
ety of Human Genetics (ASHG) contemplated ways to engage with public debates 
on human populations, psychology, and biology. However, leaders of the Society 
were worried about achieving a consensus among members, and felt that the Society 
could not make any public statement in the absence of definitive evidence or unbi-
ased studies on the topic. As Mary Mitchell noted, they were also concerned about 
professional issues in legitimizing the new discipline (2017).
Eventually, the ASHG appointed a Social Issues Committee for exploring gen-
eral social aspects relating to genetics, which eventually began to focus on genetic 
screening and prenatal diagnosis. In its work, the ASHG committee tried to build a 
wall between matters of fact and matters of value, with the aim of promoting a pre-
cise vision of the role of geneticists in society—in Mitchell’s words, “a technocratic 
advising role and a neutral, apolitical facade” (2017, p. 437).50 Thus, in the case of 
the ASHG’s deliberations, the performance of political neutrality reflected a rather 
clear political agenda.51
By contrast, the GSA’s action was motivated, from the very beginning, by the 
aspiration of taking an active part in the wider IQ controversy. The correspondence 
about the issue reveals the aims of informing educators and policymakers, counter-
ing racism, and settling the IQ controversy at all levels. In this sense, the pursuit of 
neutrality seems to reflect no clear political agenda, apart from the mere attempt of 
achieving a consensus between the society’s members.
Despite the political inclinations of the members of the committee, as well as 
the pragmatical motivation of the GSA’s action, the wall between facts and values 
eventually had to be rebuilt. In this sense, the history of the Resolution points to 
the disconnection between the ultimate goal of settling sensitive debates (which per-
haps cannot be other than political) and the ways in which scientific societies are 
expected to function by their members, the public, and other institutions.52 It may be 
that there was simply no way for the GSA to deliver a message with some practical 
(social, educational, political) effect. Although a definitive answer to this question 
cannot be provided here, this is certainly an aspect that contemporary scientific soci-
eties may wish to take into consideration in the drafting of statements like the Reso-
lution; it is possible, that is, that taking a political stance at any level is not a viable 
option for scientific societies.
Another factor involved in the limited impact of the Resolution, for which there 
was probably little remedy, concerns the way in which the public tends to perceive 
statements criticizing existing literature rather than developing alternative, positive 
50 Questions concerning the relationship between scientific societies and the public extend beyond the 
domain of the life sciences. For instance, they relate to the attempt to enhance the awareness of math-
ematics in the postwar era, in which the American Mathematical Society aimed at taking a public posture 
to communicate the relevance of mathematics to society (see Barany 2017).
51 As regards the IQ controversy, the ASHG committee invited James Crow (1969) and Luigi Cavalli-
Sforza and Walter Bodmer (1970) to write articles challenging Jensen’s arguments, but the Society itself 
never took a collective position.
52 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I explore this aspect further.
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proposals. As Philip Kitcher noted, criticisms or retractions do not entirely counter 
the force of the initial announcement and usually do not receive the same publicity 
(1997, p. 302). It is plausible that the limited impact of the Resolution—as well as 
of other statements of the same sort—depended on such an asymmetry. By their 
very nature, statements by scientific societies are often solicited by the publication 
of other (usually controversial) works.
Given such considerations, in trying to identify potential lessons for the future, it 
may be useful to focus on the following question: Is there anything that the GSA—
as a scientific society publishing a statement in response to other publications—
could have done differently?
As regards the scientific content, apart from a brief reference to the heritability/
canalization distinction, the final Resolution put little emphasis on the role of the 
environment in shaping human psychological development—an aspect in which 
the public is usually very interested. The committee could have included this topic 
in the Resolution without loss of impartiality, as no GSA member ever denied the 
significance of the interactions between an organism and its environment. This cer-
tainly is a technical problem, but still a crucial one that may have an effect on the 
public’s understanding of the IQ controversy in all its forms.53 Even more worri-
some is the absence of any discussion as to whether the human groups investigated 
within genetic research corresponded to “biological categories.” In the Resolution, 
there is reference to the fact that intellectual abilities are not uniformly distributed in 
human populations:
All human populations have a vast store of genes in common; yet within pop-
ulations, individuals differ in genes affecting many characters. Each popula-
tion contains individuals with abilities far above and below the average of the 
group.54
However, the concept of race itself is never questioned. This is surprising if we con-
sider that the 1950s UNESCO’s discussion (1950, 1952) involved major debates on 
the validity of the concept, attesting the importance of the problem for scientists of 
various backgrounds (Brattain 2007).55
Overall, given the scientific “inclination” of the final Resolution (at the expense 
of its political connotation), one would expect more attention paid to cardinal scien-
tific problems like the two above. But what about the relationship between science 
53 One might argue that we now have much more evidence on the topic than we had in the 1970s, so that 
we cannot blame the GSA for not having addressed the problem. However, work on genetic interactions 
dates back to the early twentieth century; for example, see Bateson (1909); Carlborg and Haley (2004); 
Cordell (2002). Genotype-environment interactions were well established and discussed with respect 
to the study of norms of reaction and within discussions on the limitations of quantitative genetics; for 
example, Dobzhansky (1955); Lewontin (1974); see also Fuller et al. (2005); Nelson (2013); Paul (1998); 
Serpico (2020).
54 Elizabeth Russell, “Statement of GSA Members on Heredity, Race, and IQ,” undated, Turner Collec-
tion, Leeds.
55 For recent statements on this topic from scientific societies, see ASHG (2018), Fuentes et al. (2019). 
For a critical review on this topic, see James and Burgos (2020).
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and politics? It is worth mentioning that the very meaning of the two terms was 
never explicitly discussed in the correspondence, although many scholars wrote 
extensively about the ethical, social, and political implications of genetic findings. 
It is plausible that the writers attempted to keep scientific and political aspects sepa-
rate from each other in order to avoid the politically loaded overtones that usually 
characterized the work of scholars who were personally involved in the IQ contro-
versy. This is attested, for instance, by the fact that no member of the committee was 
inclined to support the hereditarian view, and yet only Echols advocated making a 
strong statement to this effect (see Provine 1979, p. 23).
As I have shown, the correspondence between the GSA members favored an even 
stronger disconnection between the ethical and scientific aspects of the controversy. 
However, by pursuing such a disconnection, the Resolution was unable to uncover 
ways in which non-scientific values can affect empirical research. For example, 
whether IQ tests measure intelligence is a technical question concerning construct 
validity in psychometrics (Cianciolo and Sternberg 2008). However, it also depends 
on how one defines intelligence and which cognitive abilities are considered relevant 
for such a trait, and thus involves perspectival, cultural, and social elements (Rich-
ardson 2000; Sternberg and Grigorenko 2004). Likewise, the partitioning of humans 
into distinct groups can depend on pre-scientific, interest-relative, or even biased 
interpretations of what matters as a group-defining characteristic (for example, skin 
color, culture, or geographical factors).
A full exploration of the relationship between values and science is beyond the 
aims of this paper.56 However, it should be noted that philosophical debates on this 
topic in the 1970s were not as developed as they are today (although this is an aspect 
that Douglas Futuyma, for instance, suggested considering). Contemporary scien-
tific societies certainly have more resources than the GSA did several decades ago.
These considerations suggest that scientific research and findings are neither 
disconnected from their motivations, nor from their effects. In a sense, scientific 
research always involves some political factors, and a clear-cut distinction between 
science and politics can be elusive (if not misleading) in some contexts. As some 
GSA members suggested in their correspondence on this topic, the very choice to 
investigate the relationship between IQ and genetics across human populations may 
reflect specific political beliefs.
One final aspect that the Resolution could have discussed more is the responsibil-
ity of scientists. The document fails to emphasize the essential need to ensure the 
highest standards of quality, precision, and reliability of scientific research on this 
topic.57 The GSA could also have noted that scientists working in this area have a 
duty to prove not only that their work will have positive effects on society, that is, 
56 For classical works in this area, see Douglas (2009), Laudan (1984), and Longino (1996).
57 Some scholars have lamented that this requirement is inappropriate. For instance, Gottfredson (2007) 
argued that it represents an attempt to suppress research that might produce politically-socially challeng-
ing results, and that all studies should be held to high standards. Although research quality is an ideal 
that every researcher should pursue, requiring higher standards in this field may be a cost worth paying 
if one considers the potential harm of social policies based on inadequate or biased data; see Hunt and 
Carlson (2007b); Callier and Bonham (2015).
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will help people achieve their full potential (Hunt and Carlson 2007a), but also that 
empirical findings will have no negative effects, that is, will not increase racist feel-
ings and discrimination.58 The GSA ought to have taken a clearer and sharper posi-
tion on this point.
Conclusion
In this paper, I delineated the three-year process that shaped the “Resolution of 
Genetics, Race, and Intelligence” published by the Genetics Society of America in 
1976. I also outlined the main motivations behind the GSA’s action and discussed 
the reasons for its failure to achieve its aim of settling the IQ controversy. I made 
the case that the limited impact of the Resolution mostly depended on the scientific 
and political impartiality of the final version, which reflected a shift in the aims of 
the committee due to the extensive controversies that surrounded the GSA’s action. 
In its early stages, the document was a statement written by scientists for public 
consumption. At the end of the process, however, the Resolution turned into a report 
on scientists’ disagreement on the genetics of group differences. The public impact 
of a statement of this sort is naturally limited in comparison to the impact the earlier 
versions might have had.
The cautious tones and impartiality made it hard to see the very meaningfulness 
of the Resolution. In retrospect, defending some specific scientific ideas and taking a 
political stance would probably have been necessary in order to make the statement 
as impactful as expected. However, as the correspondence between the society’s 
members attests, many believed that this was outside the capacities of a scientific 
society like the GSA. This is even more telling if we consider the marked political 
inclination and sensibility of the members of the committee.
In this sense, the history of the Resolution is particularly enlightening as regards 
attempts to settle debates at the crossroad of science, ethics, and politics. It is only 
by looking at the history of the whole affair that we can appreciate the importance of 
the GSA’s participation—including its failure—in debates on genetics, intelligence, 
and human populations, and possibly beyond.
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